



Royal Model United Nations
2026

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Dearest participants of ROYMUN'26,

It is the greatest honor to welcome you to the first edition of Royal Model United Nations 2026 and our UNSC committee.

While shaping the ideas from the very beginning, our main goal was to ensure an extensive experience with both academic and organisational perfection.

In this prestigious committee, you will be raising impeccable ideas, debating about the current and the upcoming process, building new structures and turning the non-integrated actions and solutions to a masterpiece. Your board members will be guiding you to reach perfection in any situation.

While preparing, you will be discovering every single step about your topic and you may even find yourself in the middle of this sequence of events. It will be clear that you embrace your role in the committee.

Keep in mind that every speech you deliver, every motion you give, every question that you ask will gain a new perspective for everyone. The key point is to remain active and work confidentially while shaping the decision-making process with your colleagues.

As the Secretary-General, I am impatiently waiting to see your intelligent work and looking forward to sharing this royal experience with you.

Sincerely,

İmge Belgin

Secretary-General of ROYMUN'26



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LETTER FROM THE CHAIRBOARD

It is our distinct privilege to welcome you to the United Nations Security Council at this session. As the body charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, the decisions made within this chamber carry unparalleled geopolitical weight. The agenda before us demands not only a sophisticated understanding of international law and state sovereignty but also the diplomatic tact required to navigate deep strategic divides. We expect each of you to rise to the occasion, embodying the foreign policies of your respective nations with rigor, critical insight, and a commitment to constructive debate.

This problem which is developing in the Sahel region because of the failure of democratic government and the consequent absence of host-country support for international peacekeeping operations constitutes a major threat to the security system of the world. As representatives of the Security Council, your job is not just to consider temporary solutions, but to face the structural problems that lie ahead of modern multilateralism. You should weigh the necessity of protecting state sovereignty in terms of the pressing need for collective security and counter-terrorism efforts as well as respect for human rights.

In order to make this the most high-quality debate possible, we ask that all delegates come prepared and well-informed about their country profiles and procedure rules. In this committee, we will be rewarding innovation in problem solving, diplomatic sophistication, and collaboration. It is highly advised that you use this background guide as a jumping point to conduct further independent research on the intricacies of the situation at hand.

We are excited to watch a simulation that will be characterized by high-level negotiations and diplomatic skills. In case of any queries that may arise during preparation, we encourage you to contact us for assistance using the following info.

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3. Keywords

- Chapter VI (UN Charter): The section governing the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," authorizing the UNSC to recommend peaceful resolution mechanisms like mediation, arbitration, and special political envoys.
- Chapter VII (UN Charter): The robust section governing "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace," empowering the UNSC to issue legally binding directives, economic sanctions, arms embargoes, or military force.
- Article 25 (UN Charter): The legal pillar declaring that all UN Member States agree to accept and execute the legally binding decisions and resolutions of the Security Council.
- Host-Nation Consent: The foundational legal requirement of traditional UN peacekeeping stating that a mission must have the explicit agreement of the host government to operate on its sovereign territory.
- UNOWAS (UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel): The UN's primary political and preventive diplomacy mission focused on monitoring regional conflicts and facilitating peaceful political dialogue.
- UNSC Resolution 2719: A landmark 2023 resolution establishing a structural framework for the UN to financially support and fund peace operations led explicitly by the African Union (AU).
- ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States): A regional political and economic union of 15 countries that historically enforces democratic norms through economic sanctions or military interventions against coups.
- AES (Alliance of Sahel States): A mutual defense and political confederation formed in September 2023 by the military juntas of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso that explicitly rejects ECOWAS and Western integration.
- African Union (AU): The continental body of 55 African states that coordinates security, champions democratic governance, and suspends member nations undergoing unconstitutional transitions.
- G5 Sahel: A now-defunct 2014 regional security and development framework between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger that collapsed following successive military coups.
- Coup d'État: The sudden, unconstitutional, and typically military-led overthrow of a legally established civilian government.



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- The "Coup Belt": A contemporary geopolitical term describing the geographical corridor across the African continent characterized by a rapid succession of military takeovers since 2020.
- Liptako-Gourma Region: The highly volatile tri-border zone where Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso meet, serving as the primary operational epicenter for Sahelian jihadist insurgencies.
- Asymmetric Warfare: A conflict where the military capabilities of opposing forces differ significantly, characterized by state militaries fighting decentralized insurgent groups using guerrilla tactics and IEDs.
- MINUSMA: The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (2013–2023), which became the deadliest active peacekeeping mission in UN history before its forced expulsion by the Malian junta.
- Africa Corps (Wagner Group): A Russian state-backed private military contractor deployed by Sahelian juntas to provide regime security and combat support in exchange for lucrative mineral and resource concessions.
- Françafrique: A term used to critique the ongoing, informal sphere of political, economic, military, and diplomatic influence that France historically maintained over its former African colonies.
- CFA Franc: A regional currency system historically pegged to the French franc (now the Euro), heavily criticized by Sahelian populists as an instrument of ongoing economic dependency.
- Resource Economics: The strategic study of natural resource allocation, highlighting the paradox where Sahelian nations possess immense mineral wealth (uranium, gold) yet experience extreme poverty.
- Unconstitutional Change of Government (UCG): The formal legal terminology utilized by the AU and UN to define a coup or illegal seizure of power that violates a nation's constitutional democratic framework.



4. Introduction to the Committee

The Security Council is among the significant organs that have emerged as a result of the end of the Second World War. Indeed, the Security Council is considered to be the most crucial organ in the multilateralism framework of the world. This is because the Security Council has the mandate of ensuring international peace and security, as stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations. In contrast to the General Assembly which has been known for formulating non-legally binding resolutions, decisions formulated by the Security Council are binding for all member states, as per article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The range of activities carried out by the Security Council is quite wide and includes many tools that help to deal with any dispute that may arise. In accordance with the United Nations Charter, Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter specifies that the Security Council bears the responsibility of ensuring the peaceful resolution of disputes using such approaches as mediation, appointing special representatives, and political missions. Nevertheless, when it comes to the situation where all peaceful approaches to settling disputes become ineffective or when there is an issue that concerns national security, the Security Council applies Chapter VII of its charter.

To know how to work within the guidelines set by the UNSC will need strategic diplomacy since the composition of the Security Council has geopolitical significance all over the world. The UNSC consists of a total of fifteen members where ten members of the Security Council are chosen by the General Assembly for a period of two years. The other five members are made up of the permanent members of the UN Security Council who consist of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the People's Republic of China. It is necessary to state that the permanent members of the Security Council have the right to veto, and therefore, the motion passed in the UNSC cannot be opposed by any of the "P5."



5. Introduction to the agenda item: The Nigerian Coup and the legitimacy issue of UN Peacekeeping

This crisis, triggered by the July 2023 coup d'état in Niger, marks a critical turning point in international security in the modern world. Over the last ten years, the international community has viewed the problems in the Sahel from the perspective of foreign-funded security operations, terrorism capacity building, and large-scale United Nations Peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the ousting of Niger's democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum by General Abdourahamane Tchiani and his troops marked an end to the status quo. Niger, a country previously viewed as the last bastion of stability in the Sahel and a reliable partner in counter-terrorism operations and democratic governance, joined the ranks of Mali and Burkina Faso as another military-ruled state. Under the leadership of the military council CNSP, Niger's government was overthrown under the pretext of increasing instability and corruption.

The sudden change that has occurred in Niger cannot be explained by considering it as a purely domestic political incident. It has much to do with the legitimacy crises affecting United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and foreign military interventions. In spite of the millions of dollars spent and the years-long mission of MINUSMA in Mali, the violent extremist groups that were aligned with either Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State continued to increase in strength and territorial influence. As such, a large number of people in the region have developed a very negative view toward the foreign troops who have been deployed there, regarding them as incapable at best or neo-colonial domination tools at worst. In this regard, the juntas that rule Niamey, Bamako, and Ouagadougou have been able to fully capitalize on the sentiment by positioning the withdrawal of peacekeepers and foreign forces as necessary acts of complete national sovereignty and decolonization.

Consequences for diplomacy and security as a result of such an ideological turn are very much visible in terms of changes in institutional arrangement in the West African region. Disdaining the tough economic sanctions and first signs of armed intervention coming from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso officially quit ECOWAS and established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The Alliance has turned into a defense alliance and now represents a confederation of those countries. This political union opposes any form of traditional supervision and intentionally seeks to tear apart all existing relations with the United Nations and western countries. Taking advantage of the security void left behind as a result of leaving Europe and the USA, AES member states sought different geopolitical players as a potential ally, namely Russia.



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To the United Nations and the Security Council, the coming together of these events creates an unprecedented existential threat to the dynamics of modern-day peacekeeping. One cannot emphasize enough the importance of host-nation consent for the success of any peacekeeping mission carried out under the auspices of the UN. With Sahelian governments increasingly withdrawing their consent to UN activities and opting to join other organizations and partnerships that are more responsive to their needs, the whole concept of UN operations, which depends so much on the deployment of blue-helmeted peacekeepers into unstable countries, becomes largely redundant. Delegates need to address two different levels of a crisis: the immediate one stemming from the collapse of democracy in Niger, and the broader challenge associated with fostering stability in the region.



6. Historical Background

For the purpose of appreciating the crisis that is being experienced by Niger and its neighboring countries in the Sahelian region, it is important to have insight into the history of the countries, particularly in relation to the influence that the French government had on them. After the process of formal colonization was completed in the late 1960s, the French government still exercised great control over their colonies in Africa under what came to be referred to as "Françafrique" through defense pacts, military intervention, and economic systems like the CFA Franc. In the case of Niger, Françafrique was reflected through economics. The French companies owned by the state continued exploiting Niger's abundant uranium resources to provide electricity to Europeans, leaving the country among the poorest in human development indexes. Such an imbalance resulted in the Nigeriens viewing outsiders with disdain since they felt that foreigners were simply exploiting their resources without offering any security.

The above-mentioned structural anger acquired an extremely explosive spark in 2012 as a result of the security meltdown of the Malian state and thus brought about significant shifts in geopolitics of West Africa. The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya resulted in the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi; this way, the considerable number of well-armed Tuareg combatants had to leave the country and come to northern Mali to continue the separatist rebellion that was seized by extremist organizations associated with Al-Qaeda. Gradually approaching the capital city of Mali, the jihad militants compelled the civilian government to call for emergency help from France. The ensuing Operation Serval of 2013 stopped the rebels but turned into a multinational and perpetual counterterrorism campaign known as Operation Barkhane. Meanwhile, at the request of the UN Security Council, MINUSMA was sent to stabilize the region. Nevertheless, numerous financial resources and deployment of hundreds of soldiers did not address the problem of structural nature, including the corruption in government, poverty, and rural communities' oppression. Consequently, the asymmetrical war escalated beyond Mali border into Liptako-Gourma tri-border zone and made the entire Sahel the most dangerous place in the world for terrorism.

Such structural anger obtained a particularly explosive form during 2012 due to the security collapse of the Malian state and caused important changes in the geopolitics of West Africa.



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In particular, the 2011 NATO operation in Libya had led to the ousting of Gaddafi regime, meaning that quite a large group of armed Tuareg fighters had to move to Mali and conduct the separatist uprising supported by radical groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda organization. Moving closer to Mali capital, the jihadist militants forced the civil government to appeal for emergency aid from France. Thus, the Operation Serval of 2013 helped to stop the rebellion but evolved into a permanent and multilateral anti-terrorism campaign named Operation Barkhane. In addition, following the UN Security Council mandate, the United Nations Mission for Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed there. Nonetheless, all the efforts of numerous funds and military forces could not cope with the underlying problem of structural character of governmental corruption, poverty, and oppression of rural population. This way, the asymmetrical conflict has extended over the borders of Mali and reached tri-border area called Liptako-Gourma. As a result, the entire region of Sahel became the most dangerous part of the planet for terrorist activity.



7. Anatomy of the Crisis

The initial trigger that led to this geopolitical upheaval in the Sahel came on July 26, 2023, when members of the Nigerien Presidential Guard arrested the democratically elected president of the country, Mohamed Bazoum, from within the presidential palace in Niamey. Two days after that, Gen Abdourahamane Tchiani, who is the head of the guard, announced himself as the leader of the newly established military junta named the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP). It was not long before the military suspended the constitution and disbanded all governmental structures of the country, even closing down its borders. From an international perspective, the ousting of President Bazoum proved to be an enormous setback for the strategic community because up until that point, Niger had played a critical role as the major democratic bulwark in the fight against terrorism in the region.

The reasons for the unconstitutional overthrow of the government were based on a blend of local frustrations and internal military rivalry. According to the official declarations made by the CNSP, the reason for the coup was the continuing decline in the security situation of the country due to the ongoing violence from jihadists along with corruption and incompetence of the government in economic matters. Nonetheless, regional experts believe that the main trigger of the event was a clash in interests among members of the army. Namely, there was talk of President Bazoum's plans to reshuffle the ranks of the army and remove General Tchiani from his post. Nevertheless, no matter the original trigger of the coup, the junta managed to exploit pre-existing public anger successfully. By using the discontent caused by poverty and presence of French and American military bases in the country, CNSP managed to rally thousands of civilians against the foreign forces.

The regional response to the military overthrow in the country was immediate and intense, completely changing the security landscape of West Africa. ECOWAS, which is led by Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, responded with an unprecedented condemnation of the unconstitutional regime change. These sanctions included heavy economic and financial penalties, a freezing of the state's assets in the country, blocking all commercial relations, and cutting off nearly all power connections. On top of this, the organization issued a seven-day ultimatum for the return of President Bazoum to his presidential post or else face a military intervention by the ECOWAS forces. Instead of forcing a surrender, this ultimatum created regional instability. Both Mali and Burkina Faso, which had themselves previously faced military coups in the country, threatened retaliation in the case of any military action taken against Niger, essentially rendering this military threat useless.



8. The Legitimacy Crisis of UN & International Peacekeeping

In essence, the key operational contradiction that emerges from international involvement in the West African theater is captured by the basic principle of the United Nations itself. It revolves around the tension between Article 2, which promises total state sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs, and the contemporary necessity to protect civilians against mass atrocities. The last ten years have seen increasing mandates being granted to UN missions in West Africa, where these missions have been operating under Chapter VII in order to establish stability in the highly unstable environment. Nevertheless, the main role of such a mission traditionally revolves around traditional peacekeeping, involving the monitoring of agreements signed by certain countries. Given that violent terrorist groups, backed by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, engaged in asymmetric warfare, the civilian population was counting on those heavily-armed "blue helmets" to eliminate this threat. Naturally, when they proved incapable of satisfying this unrealistic expectation, a significant gap appeared between the mandate given to the international troops and the reality in which the people living there were faced with daily threats of violence and terror.

The discussion of the efficacy eventually came to a complete downfall of institutions' legitimacy. One such vivid example is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was established in 2013 and became the most deadly mission for UN peacekeepers, resulting in multiple casualties due to IEDs and ambushes. Despite the high cost of the peacekeepers, the public dissatisfaction with the organization grew significantly. As seen from surveys carried out over time, an overwhelmingly majority of the urban population had a negative perception of the inability of UN organizations to stop insurgent attacks. The coup d'état in Bamako effectively used this discontent to form a powerful combination of public outrage against Western countries and the UN organization in particular. This situation was further fueled by the accusations of the human rights abuses in the MINUSMA mission, made by MINUSMA agents. The military junta of the country firmly denied these accusations of the neocolonial intervention in the internal affairs of their sovereign state.



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In fact, the consequences of the diplomatic breakdown shattered the very basis for all UN activities: the consent of the hosting nation. As reported in June 2023, the transitional military government of Mali addressed the UN Security Council and called for immediate removal of MINUSMA. As the Security Council understood that a peacekeeping operation could not stay in a hostile environment without consent from the ruling government, it had no choice but to vote in favor of ending the peacekeeping operation. By the end of December 2023, MINUSMA finished its rapid withdrawal of over 13,000 peacekeepers. This was evidence of a new situation when the governments under attack by insurgents could successfully repel the most important peacekeeping organization in the world with full support from their populations.

It is clear that the outcomes of this withdrawal are the creation of a terrible security vacuum in the area requiring a radical change of the strategy of global interventions. Apart from the withdrawal of the necessary support in logistics and medical aid for regional counter-terrorism organizations such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force, this action also makes it evident for the concerned governments that the international community does not have enough means to force the former to follow its rules and regulations. Now that the structural constraint that ensured UN supervision over the situation in the region has been withdrawn, the countries in question will pay less attention to protecting their democratic and humanitarian ideals and will prefer engaging private armies to do their fighting instead. From the perspective of diplomats and international security specialists, the issue is that obtaining consent for the operations in the region is not an easy thing to achieve, and a solution to the problem should be found immediately.



9. Shifting Geopolitics and New Security Architectures

Diplomatic estrangement caused by the unconstitutional overthrow of the government in Niger has accelerated an abrupt and deep shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Sahel region. Explicitly in violation of the sanctions and threats of military action imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the military regimes in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso declared their official estrangement from the regional organization. In September 2023, the three countries signed the Liptako-Gourma Charter, thereby launching the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Originally conceived as a mutual military alliance aimed at repelling any ECOWAS efforts to militarily intervene and to consolidate the available resources for resisting the spread of the jihadists, AES has quickly transformed into an all-encompassing political project. Already by the early months of 2024, AES member states made plans to establish an institutionalized confederation, thus completing a wholesale rejection of any form of West African diplomatic cooperation. The AES stands on the foundation of sovereign statehood, which is explicitly anti-imperialist and opposed to Western influence, and its new kind of security-first regionalism is ideologically incompatible with democratic principles espoused by the African Union and the UN.

Concurrently, the new regional blockage has also initiated a process of the systematic unraveling of years of military cooperation between the West and African states, resulting in the deliberate creation of a huge security vacuum at the heart of the African continent. Niger, which was one of the most important centers of Western counterterrorism logistics, followed suit in an identical manner to what happened in Mali and Burkina Faso. In late 2023, the junta in Niger issued orders that saw the immediate expulsion of all French military presence from the country, including the termination of diplomatic ties with the European Union. The situation worsened in early 2024 when the junta also canceled its military cooperation agreement with the United States, forcing the Americans to withdraw from the country in its totality, including the withdrawal of troops from Agadez. Agadez was home to the American Air Base 201, a strategic facility worth \$100 million that was used as the base for ISR missions in both North and West Africa.

In order to address this tremendous security deficit, the AES countries have been moving swiftly toward different geopolitical partners, thereby tipping the scales of the balance of power in favor of a new multipolar Sahel. The Russian Federation has taken advantage of this anti-Western stance in full measure.



With the help of deploying the “Africa Corps” (formerly known as the state-sponsored private military corporation named Wagner Group), Russia has secured its position in the region. Unlike the UN or Western countries that tie their security aid to the compliance with certain conditions and timeline concerning human rights and democracy, Russian private military organizations provide a “no-strings-attached” service for regimes' survival. In return for access to natural resources like gold or uranium, contractors supply direct combat forces, weapons, and bodyguards to the junta leaders. This model of security prioritizes the elimination of immediate threat to the state over protection of civilians and leaves the structural roots of the insurgency totally untapped in the framework of the UNSC mission to protect human rights.

10. The Security Council's Strategic Dilemmas and Future Outlook

The problem faced by the United Nations Security Council in regards to the multiple crises in the Sahel represents a serious institutional dilemma. Although the Council has been assigned the task of preserving peace and security worldwide, it is unable to operate effectively within the context of an increasingly fragmented world order as well as a region that openly rejects its conventional tools of intervention. After the sudden end of the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali and the withdrawal of the Western military from Niger and Burkina Faso, the Security Council is no longer able to operate effectively in West Africa. Traditionally, the UN relied on sending large numbers of armed blue helmets as authorized by Chapter VII to restore stability in volatile parts of the world, but this tool is no longer available due to the circumstances in the Sahel. Indeed, one of the fundamental preconditions for any UN peacekeeping mission in the region is the consent of the host nations; after juntas deny this condition and see the UN presence as a form of neocolonial violation of their sovereignty, the Council is unable to send peacekeepers without violating the principle of sovereignty. This new geopolitical configuration has made things rather complicated in relation to UNOWAS. This is because UNOWAS depends only on the use of good offices and mediation within the discourse of politics to prevent the emergence of conflict situations as well as to ensure that transitions into democracy are smooth. However, the military junta in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso that is seeking to break off ties with ECOWAS and has no time frame for getting back to democracy is making it difficult for the UNOWAS envoy to conduct diplomacy. The issue here is how to maintain communication with the military regimes without giving recognition to the military regime so as not to legitimize its illegitimate grab for power. On one side, if the UN adopts a strict position, insisting on speedy democratic elections, it might find itself in isolation within the region and unable to observe human rights abuses or mediate in any disputes between the nations. On the other side, if it follows a completely pragmatic approach by recognizing the military regimes, then it will be going against everything the UN stands for and will be legitimizing the 'coup belt' phenomenon.



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First and foremost, the most pressing issue as a result of the inability of institutions to address this situation is an exploding humanitarian disaster that the international community is completely unprepared to respond to. In the absence of any kind of protection, due to the withdrawal of the UN and Western troops from Mali, civilian lives are now in the crosshairs as various extremist and transnational terrorist groups, linked to both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, take advantage of this void in order to engage in asymmetrical warfare against the local population. This includes mass killings of civilians, surrounding whole towns, as well as destruction of all sorts of crucial infrastructure, including schools and medical institutions. Indeed, the inability of the UN Security Council to facilitate humanitarian aid to be delivered becomes apparent through the simple fact that aid workers are now unable to deliver humanitarian aid safely in the face of lack of UN peacekeepers' logistic support and security cover. Moreover, military juntas have recently grown suspicious of independent humanitarian work, imposing further limitations on foreign aid agencies operating in the area.

In the absence of a practical UN peacekeeping system, the Security Council appears to be having to venture into new architectural models for regional stability, including moving the responsibility for intervention onto the African Union (AU) and sub-regional groups. One central issue for future UN policy strategy will be the implementation of Resolution 2719 of the UN Security Council in late 2023, which created a groundbreaking model for employing UN assessed contributions to fund peace support missions led by the African Union. In terms of the Sahel, this may represent a paradigm shift. Since the juntas firmly oppose any interventions from the West or the UN, the only political path available to stabilize the region may be through an armed mission composed solely of African countries, led politically by the AU but funded by the UN. Nevertheless, the realization of such an ambitious program faces enormous obstacles. There is still much disagreement in the Security Council about oversight, human rights, and financial controls of troops led by the AU. Moreover, the very countries that now need to be stabilized have proven quite ready to break off relations with other African countries dictating their internal security policy.

In the end, the future of the Sahel lies in the readiness of the Security Council to move away from obsolete approaches to intervention, which rely on highly centralized diplomacy. These are some of the crucial questions that delegates of this committee need to answer. Namely, how should the UN define the term “peacebuilding” in an area, where governments would rather contract private military firms than allow UN troops into their territory? What kind of diplomacy should be developed by the Security Council in order to prevent human rights violations in an area, where sanctions simply impoverish the civilian population, while pushing juntas closer to the sphere of influence of geopolitical competitors? The coup d'état in Niger has shown that the time of uncontested UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, backed by the West, is over. The Security Council needs to devise a completely new diplomatic approach based on a careful balance between the imperative of absolute sovereignty and the necessity of collective security, counterterrorism cooperation, and human rights protection.



11. Questions to be Addressed

1. How can the United Nations Security Council reform mission mandates to include legal and logistical protocols for when a host state abruptly revokes its consent, ensuring the immediate protection of civilians is maintained during a withdrawal?
2. What specific joint programs, such as infrastructure rebuilding or local hiring initiatives, should UNSC missions include in their mandates to directly improve community trust and cooperation?
3. What legal system or independent court framework can the UN create to guarantee that peacekeepers who commit crimes are transparently put on trial and held accountable?
4. What diplomatic strategies can the UN employ to foster operational cooperation between competing or fractured regional blocs to ensure the resumption of vital cross-border security initiatives?
5. How can the Security Council implement strict, prioritized benchmarking in mission design to prevent resource overextension and ensure achievable stabilization goals?
6. What funding mechanisms can the UNSC use to insulate peacekeeping operations?
7. What standardized frameworks for transnational intelligence-sharing and technological interoperability can be authorized to assist peacekeepers in monitoring unmapped borders and asymmetric threats?



12. Directives 101

The United Nations Security Council is a Semi-Crisis committee and has two main ways of moving forwards: the directive paper and the Resolution Paper.

A directive is an action based document usually submitted by delegates after an update

It is a short paper compared to the resolution paper and it's a specific, action-oriented instruction that tells the committee or an institution within the committee's authority, to take a defined action. Directives are drafted collaboratively, debated on the floor, voted on by the full committee, and then submitted to the Chairs for ratification before taking effect. Understanding what makes a directive good is essential. Most first-time Semi-Crisis or Crisis delegates make one of two mistakes: they write directives that are too vague to have any practical effect, or they write directives that are historically implausible. Both mistakes will be identified by the chairs, and neither will advance the committee. A vague directive sounds like this: "Nigeria resolves to support national unity in the face of external aggression and to take all necessary measures to protect the security of the Republic." This directive does nothing. It commits no one to any specific action. It can be signed by everyone and mean nothing. The chairs will return it. A strong directive is specific, historically grounded,

politically realistic, and consequential. It clearly explains Who is acting What action is being taken How it will be carried out What resources are required What outcome is expected.



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Types of Directives

Committee Directives: In committee directives, you take actions as the whole cabinet by using the powers of the cabinet. Since these directives will affect all of the committee, it is crucial that you should work together in coordination and reach middle grounds about your ideas and every delegate in the committee must consent to the directive.

Personal Directives: In personal directives, you take actions as yourself by using your own personal powers. Since you will be using your own powers, you should consider what powers does your character have. For example, a character who is a commander can take some military actions etc.

Top Secret Directives: In top secret directives, you also take actions by using your personal powers but the difference is that the directive will not be known by anyone in your cabinet.

Press Releases: In press releases, you are addressing the people in the country by using media organs. They are crucial for controlling the public opinion so you should use them wisely.

How to Write a Good Directive

The directive below was written by us to give you an example for a good directive. It's not similar to most of the directives but a directive like this is good enough for the crisis committees.

[YOUR CABINET] 15.43

From: *Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus*

To: *All the Proconsuls and Military Officials in and near Piacenza*

Every single pig in these villages will be given to military officers. Only 2 pigs will be left in each village in order for villagers to re breed the pigs. After the pigs have been collected, they will be kept in a rural side of Piacenza in a secure barn and bred constantly. These pigs will be used against the Carthagian Elephants when the time comes. This plan will be explained in the war directive when the battle seems near. This army of pigs will be called "War Pigs".



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Features of a Good Directive.

- **It bears a proper name:** Always write your character's name and the committee on the directive. It makes life easier for everyone, and also adds another layer of professionalism to the directive.
- **It has the time you sent the directive:** It is highly suggested that you write the time on top of the directive that you are sending. It will be easier for the crisis team to read and reply to your directive.
- **It's reasonable and it's realistic:** While this is a simulation and we do allow some extremeness, you can not just write a directive about killing half of the population or things like 'we will use super-duper secret very technological spy devices that can not be noticed or removed.
- **It's detailed:** It is highly suggested to give enough details in your directives for them to be accepted and evaluated. Your directive must answer the "Five Ws and One H" questions (Who, What, Why, Where, When and How). It is also not specifically written to be a 'Top Secret' so the updates related to this directive will be given to the whole cabinet and not just the delegate.
- **Its purpose and aim is clear:** This is pretty self-explanatory.
- **It's written in a readable manner:** Of course, the crisis team doesn't expect you to use typewriters or pre-Shakespearean English, they only expect a proper handwriting for your own good. Otherwise the crisis team might have a hard time reading your directive which can lead to many bad things. One being the straight-forward rejection of your directive.



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- **Importance of ideas:** the most important thing while writing directives is ideas. Every directive comes with pros and cons. So debating upon the idea is the most important part of writing a good directive. Remember that the crisis team will always try to lure you into traps or find the weakest point in your directive. Thus they will force your minds to think the unthinkable.
- **Using accurate information:** Always QUADRUPLE check the information and the data you provide in the directive.
- **Stay on the topic, write related directives:** Also self-explanatory.
- **Writing mottos and throwing slogans won't make your directive any better:** We do agree, slogans are fun and help you get in the mindset of your character but cluttering your directive with slogans only makes it harder for the crisis team to read, to understand and to approve.



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