



Royal Model United Nations
2026

ECOSOC

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Royal Model United Nations 2026

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Dearest participants of ROYMUN'26,

It is the greatest honor to welcome you to the first edition of Royal Model United Nations 2026 and our ECOSOC committee.

While shaping the ideas from the very beginning, our main goal was to ensure an extensive experience with both academic and organisational perfection.

In this prestigious committee, you will be raising impeccable ideas, debating about the current and the upcoming process, building new structures and turning the non-integrated actions and solutions to a masterpiece. Your board members will be guiding you to reach perfection in any situation.

While preparing, you will be discovering every single step about your topic and you may even find yourself in the middle of this sequence of events. It will be clear that you embrace your role in the committee.

Keep in mind that every speech you deliver, every motion you give, every question that you ask will gain a new perspective for everyone. The key point is to remain active and work confidentially while shaping the decision-making process with your colleagues.

As the Secretary-General, I am impatiently waiting to see your intelligent work and looking forward to sharing this royal experience with you.

Sincerely,
İmge Belgin
Secretary-General of ROYMUN'26



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3. Introduction to the Committee: Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Established under Chapter X of the United Nations Charter in 1945, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is one of the six main organs of the United Nations (UN). ECOSOC is responsible both for the direction and coordination of the economic, social, humanitarian, environmental and cultural activities conducted by the UN. ECOSOC is the UN's largest and most complex subsidiary body.

3.1 ECOSOC's Member States

The Council originally started with just 18 member states. However, subsequent amendments to the UN Charter in 1965 and 1974 expanded its membership to 27 and eventually to its current size of 54 nations¹. This number of members has not changed since 1974. Members of the Economic and Social Council are elected by the General Assembly, for three-year terms². Membership is also based on geographic representation, as each geographic region is allocated a certain number of countries in the committee³. The categorization of this geographic representation is as follows: 14 'African' States, 11 'Asia-Pacific' States, 10 'Latin American and Caribbean' States, 6 'Eastern European' States, and 13 'Western European and Other' States⁴. The Committee meets throughout the year and holds a major session in July, during which a high-level meeting of Ministers discusses major economic, social and humanitarian issues⁵. Each member of ECOSOC has one vote. Decisions are taken by simple majority vote⁶. Four of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States of America) have been continuously elected because they provide funding for most of ECOSOC's budget, which is the largest of any UN subsidiary body⁷. The presidency of ECOSOC changes annually⁸. However, unlike in the Security Council, these permanent members do not have a veto right.

¹ Fomerand, Jacques, and Cecelia M Lynch. 1999. "United Nations (UN) | Definition, History, Founders, Flag, & Facts." Encyclopedia Britannica. July 26, 1999. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations/Economic-and-Social-Council#ref12405>.

² Economic and Social Council." 2026. Un.org. February 10, 2026. <http://www.un.org/ecosoc/en>.

³ "Operational Activities for Development Segment," United Nations Economic and Social Council, accessed February 5, 2026, <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/content/operational-activities-development-segment>.

⁴ "Economic and Social Council." 2026.

⁵ "Humanitarian Affairs Segment," United Nations Economic and Social Council, accessed February 5, 2026, <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/humanitarian-affairs-segment>.

⁶ "Science, Technology and Innovation for Development," United Nations Economic and Social Council, accessed February 5, 2026, <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/content/science-technology-and-innovation-development>.

⁷ "About Us | United Nations Economic and Social Council." United Nations, 2020. <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/en/about-us>

⁸ "About Us | United Nations Economic and Social Council." United Nations, 2020.



3.2 Authority and Power of ECOSOC

Chapter X of the United Nations Charter construct the mandate and functions of the Economic and Social Council as follows:

Article 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.
4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly⁹.
2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.

Article 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.
2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.



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Article 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.
2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.
3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.”

ECOSOC is authorized to recommend international action on economic and social issues; promote universal respect for human rights; and work for global cooperation on health, education, culture and other related areas. It is the principal body for discussing international economic and social issues, formulating policy recommendations, fostering debate and innovative thinking and, if necessary, forging consensus on ways forward. The Council has been reformed on many occasions with the most far-reaching reform being the reforms of 2013. On 20 September 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution 68/1, which recognized the lead role of ECOSOC in identifying emerging challenges and promoting reflection, debate and innovative thinking on development, as well as in achieving a balanced integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development¹⁰.

⁹ “Chapter X: The Economic and Social Council (Articles 61–72),” United Nations, accessed February 25, 2026, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-10>.

¹⁰ “Further Review of the Implementation of Resolution 61/16 on the Strengthening of the Economic and Social Council.” United Nations, 2020. <https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/strengtheningofecosoc.shtml>



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In recent years, therefore, ECOSOC has also taken up the responsibility to deal with sustainable development in light of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Council plays a key role in fostering international cooperation for development. Since 2013, The Council has been following the development of the international community and has been placing on its agenda topics about the relations between developed and developing countries, environmental science and technology and the preservation of natural resources. Resolution 68/1 also furthered the mandate of the Council via the provision of power to adopt annual themes and power to monitor and control the balanced integration of the three domains of sustainable development¹¹. ECOSOC channels a diverse family of UN bodies dedicated to sustainable development, providing overall guidance and coordination. The entities which include regional economic and social commissions, functional commissions facilitating intergovernmental discussions of major global issues, and specialized agencies, programs and funds at work around the world to translate development commitments into real changes in people's lives¹². Most of ECOSOC's work is performed in functional commissions on topics such as human rights, narcotics, population, social development, statistics, the status of women, and science and technology¹³. Therefore, ECOSOC coordinates the activities of various UN programs and specialized agencies such as the Human Rights Council and the Commission of the Status of Women. These commissions meet regularly and report back to ECOSOC. The council also oversees regional commissions for Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Western Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These commissions deal with special problems that people live in different geographical areas face. ECOSOC has five regional commissions that promote economic development and cooperation in their respective regions: Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)¹⁴. Currently the Economic and Social Council oversees 14 UN specialized agencies, 8 functional commissions and 5 regional commissions: in addition to receiving reports from 9 UN funds and programs¹⁵.

¹¹ About Us | United Nations Economic and Social Council." United Nations, 2026.

¹² About Us | United Nations Economic and Social Council." United Nations, 2026.

¹³ About Us | United Nations Economic and Social Council." United Nations, 2026.

¹⁴ "Economic and Social Council – Model United Nations." United Nations Outreach, 2020.

<https://outreach.un.org/mun/content/economic-and-social-council>

¹⁵ "Subsidiary Bodies of ECOSOC | United Nations Economic and Social Council." United Nations, 2020.



The UN charter also allows ECOSOC to grant consultative status to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), thereby maintaining a vital link between the United Nations and civil society¹⁶. Beginning in the mid-1990s, measures were taken to increase the participation of such NGOs, and by the early 21st century more than 2,500 NGOs had been granted consultative status.

3.3 Important Aspects of ECOSOC's Mandate Regarding the Agenda Item

Before turning to the substance of the agenda item itself, it is essential to establish the institutional landscape within which ECOSOC operates on questions of energy governance. It is populated by a constellation of treaty bodies, intergovernmental agencies, and voluntary frameworks that do not always speak with one voice. For delegates to engage meaningfully with the agenda item, they must first understand which institution holds what authority, and also more critically, where ECOSOC's own coordinative mandate begins, and where it uniquely prevails.

The 2022 Russia–Ukraine gas crisis and the cascading energy shocks of 2026 have made this institutional mapping not merely an academic exercise but a matter of urgent practical consequence. When pipelines are weaponized, when energy prices become instruments of geopolitical coercion, and when the most vulnerable economies are left absorbing shocks they did not cause, the question of which multilateral body is empowered to respond becomes existential. As will be mentioned in the subsections below, ECOSOC's mandate in this regard is neither technical nor peripheral. It is, at its core, a development mandate: one that positions the Council as the indispensable bridge between the legal architecture of climate and energy agreements and the socio-economic realities of a world in energy transition.

3.3.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, constitutes the foundational legal instrument of the international community's response to the climate change¹⁷. As a framework convention, the UNFCCC does not itself impose binding emissions reduction targets; rather than that, UNFCCC establishes the **overarching normative architecture** within which subsequent agreements are

¹⁶ “Subsidiary Bodies of ECOSOC | United Nations Economic and Social Council.” United Nations, 2020.

¹⁷ United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, Preamble.



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nested¹⁸. It currently counts 198 Parties, making it one of the most universally ratified treaties in the history of international law¹⁹.

The Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the UNFCCC's first binding instrument, introduced quantified emissions limitation and reduction commitments for developed countries for the period 2008–2012, later extended through the Doha Amendment to 2020²⁰. While the Protocol's architecture of differentiated obligations represented a landmark in international environmental law, its practical impact was severely constrained by the withdrawal of the United States in March 2001 which is a decision the Bush administration made by the idea of economic competitiveness and the exemption of major emerging economies from commitments²¹. It was a legal monument to a political compromise that arrived too late and reached too few.

It was against this backdrop of institutional fatigue that the Paris Agreement of 2015 represented a genuine shift²². Adopted by 196 Parties at COP21, the Agreement replaced the top-down, target-assignment model of Kyoto with a bottom-up architecture of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): self-defined, nationally owned pledges to reduce emissions subject to a ratchet mechanism requiring progressive ambition over successive five-year cycles²³. The Agreement's central temperature goal (to limit the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, with efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C) has since become the main goal of international climate diplomacy²⁴.

For the purposes of the present agenda item, however, the Paris Agreement's most consequential provisions are not its temperature targets but its recognition of the deep structural interdependence between climate action and sustainable development. Article 2.1(c) explicitly frames the Agreement's financial flows goal which making finance consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, as inseparable from the broader development agenda²⁵. This framing is of direct relevance to ECOSOC. It acknowledges that the energy transition is not merely an environmental

¹⁸ UNFCCC, art. 3.

¹⁹ United Nations Treaty Collection, "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change," accessed June 2026, <https://treaties.un.org>.

²⁰ United Nations, *Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, December 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, Annex B.

²¹ Tora Skodvin and Steinar Andresen, "An Agenda for Change in U.S. Climate Policies? Presidential Ambitions and Congressional Powers," *International Environmental Agreements* 9, no. 3 (2009): 263–280; see also National Security Archive, "The U.S. and Climate Change: Washington's See-Saw on Global Leadership," September 24, 2018, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu>.

²² United Nations, *Paris Agreement*, December 12, 2015, in force November 4, 2016, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.

²³ Paris Agreement, art. 4.

²⁴ Paris Agreement, art. 2.1(a).

²⁵ Paris Agreement, art. 2.1(c).



imperative but a development challenge of the first order: one that requires the alignment of financial systems, technology transfer mechanisms, and capacity-building frameworks with the needs of the most vulnerable economies.

Yet the Paris Agreement, for all its normative ambition, carries a critical structural limitation that ECOSOC delegates must internalize: it is a framework of aspiration, not enforcement. The NDC mechanism relies entirely on the voluntary compliance of its Parties, and the Agreement contains no punitive mechanism for non-compliance beyond reputational cost²⁶. The 2022 Russia–Ukraine gas crisis exposed this limitation with brutal clarity. As European states scrambled to replace Russian pipeline gas; Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and others were compelled to reactivate or extend coal-fired power plants, effectively suspending their transition commitments in the name of energy security²⁷. Climate architecture had no answer for a world in which energy had become a weapon.

3.3.2 Clarification of Mandates: ECOSOC's Coordinative Supremacy over the Energy Governance Landscape

Delegates must approach this subsection with a precise understanding of a foundational institutional distinction. The UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are legal instruments: they define what states have committed to do in the domain of climate and energy transition. ECOSOC, by contrast, is a coordinating organ: it is the principal body within the United Nations system responsible for ensuring that what states have committed to do in law is translated into coherent, equitable, and implementable development policy. This distinction is not merely procedural. It is the source of ECOSOC's unique institutional authority in the present conjuncture.

The energy governance landscape that ECOSOC must navigate is populated by bodies of considerable technical expertise and sectoral authority. The International Energy Agency (IEA), established in 1974 in the aftermath of the first oil shock, functions as the preeminent analytical and advisory body for energy security, but its membership structure is explicitly restricted to OECD economies, meaning that the IEA's 32 member countries represent only

²⁶ Lavanya Rajamani, "Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 65, no. 2 (2016): 493–514; see also Charlotte Streck et al., "Paris Agreement: A New Paradigm of Voluntary Nationally Determined Mitigation Commitments?" *Climate Policy* 16, no. 8 (2016): 920–931.

²⁷ Adrien Fabre and Thomas Douenne, "Weaponised Energy and Climate Change: Assessing Europe's Response to the Ukraine War," *LSE Public Policy Review* 3, no. 2 (2023); International Energy Agency, *Russia's War on Ukraine — Energy Factsheets*, accessed June 2026, <https://www.iea.org/topics/russias-war-on-ukraine>.



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approximately 16 percent of the world's population²⁸. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), established in 2009, serves as the global intergovernmental forum for the promotion of renewable energy, providing data, technical assistance, and policy guidance to its 168 member states²⁹. Each of these bodies holds genuine expertise within its own domain. What neither possesses, however, is ECOSOC's mandate to integrate energy governance with the full spectrum of the United Nations' social and economic agenda.

The IEA's membership architecture systematically excludes the Global South where are the very economies most acutely exposed to the developmental consequences of energy price volatility and transition costs. As the 2026 Hormuz energy crisis demonstrated, developing countries are among the least able to absorb emergency fuel price shocks, lacking both strategic petroleum reserves and the fiscal buffers necessary to cushion their populations from surging import bills³⁰. IRENA, while more inclusive in membership, lacks enforcement authority and operates primarily as a knowledge platform. The UNFCCC's Conference of the Parties, for its part, is constrained by its own treaty boundaries to the domain of climate: it cannot, by its own mandate, address the cascading socio-economic consequences of energy shocks through the lens of poverty, inequality, or institutional capacity.

This is precisely where ECOSOC's coordinative supremacy becomes indispensable. Under Article 62 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC is empowered to make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters, and to make recommendations on any such matters to the General Assembly, to Member States, and to the specialized agencies concerned³¹. This mandate confers upon ECOSOC a horizontal authority that no sectoral energy body possesses: the authority to connect the dots. Where the UNFCCC defines the destination of the energy transition, and where the IEA and IRENA map the technical pathways, ECOSOC alone holds the institutional remit to ask (and answer) the question of who bears the cost, who captures the benefit, and whether the architecture of global energy governance is consistent with the universal realization of the Sustainable Development Goals.

²⁸ Al Jazeera, "Global Energy Crisis Highlights Meagre Oil Buffers in Developing World," May 12, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/5/12>; International Energy Agency, "About the IEA," accessed June 2026, <https://www.iea.org/about>.

²⁹ International Renewable Energy Agency, "About IRENA," accessed June 2026, <https://www.irena.org/About>.

³⁰ Al Jazeera, "Global Energy Crisis Highlights Meagre Oil Buffers in Developing World," May 12, 2026.

³¹ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, art. 62, para. 1.



Delegates must therefore guard against a subtle but consequential conflation: the temptation to treat ECOSOC as merely a transmission belt for the outputs of technical energy bodies. In the present conjuncture, as the 2026 energy shocks have demonstrated, the consequences of energy governance failures are not primarily technical, but also they are developmental. They are measured in food inflation, in energy poverty, in the fiscal insolvency of import-dependent states, and in the unraveling of hard-won gains across the 2030 Agenda. It is in this space that ECOSOC's mandate is not merely relevant but irreplaceable. The Council does not manage pipelines. It governs the human consequences of the world that pipelines make possible.

4. Introduction to the Agenda Item: Green Energy Adaptation as a Pillar of International Stability: Addressing the Fallout of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis and the 2026 Global Energy Shocks

There is a moment that deserves to be remembered before any discussion of energy policy begins. It is the moment a human hand reaches toward a flame for the first time. Not to extinguish it, not to flee from it, but to carry it. That instinctive, terrifying, transformative act marked the beginning of humanity's longest and most consequential relationship: the relationship with energy. From that first fire to the coal furnaces of Manchester, from the oil derricks of Pennsylvania to the gas pipelines threading beneath the European continent, every chapter of human civilization has been a story about how people extract, control, and distribute the power/energy to act in the world³².

For most of that story, energy was a local affair. It came from the wood stacked outside the door, the river flowing past the mill, the wind filling the sail. Its geography was intimate, its politics contained. The Industrial Revolution revolutionized that intimacy. When James Watt's improved steam engine began converting fossilized sunlight into mechanical power, humanity did not simply discover a new fuel source; but also, humankind discovered a new principle of interdependence³³. Coal had to be mined, transported, traded. Later, oil had to be drilled, refined, shipped across oceans. Natural gas had to be piped across thousands of kilometres of contested terrain.

³² Our World in Data, "Fossil Fuels," accessed June 2026, <https://ourworldindata.org/fossil-fuels>.

³³ World Economic Forum, "Visualizing the History of Energy Transitions," April 2022, <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/04/visualizing-the-history-of-energy-transitions/>.



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That transformation produced extraordinary abundance. It also produced extraordinary vulnerability. By the early twenty-first century, the global energy system had grown into one of the most complex and interconnected structures in human history because of a web of pipelines, tankers, grids, and contracts spanning every continent, threading through every economy, touching every household on earth. The price of a barrel of oil set in Riyadh could determine whether a family in Nairobi could afford to cook dinner. A gas dispute between Moscow and Kyiv could leave a factory in Berlin idle for a winter. Energy had become the bloodstream of the modern world, and like all bloodstreams, it was most dangerous not when it flowed too fast, but when something caused it to stop.

It stopped (or came very close stopping) on February 24, 2022. On that day, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the world discovered just how completely it had built its economic architecture upon a foundation of assumed stability³⁴. For Europe, the revelation was brutal. A continent that had persuaded itself that commercial energy interdependence was a guarantee of peace (that pipelines were too expensive to weaponize) watched as Russia cut 80 billion cubic metres of pipeline gas supplies, plunging the region into an energy crisis without precedent in the post-war era³⁵. Gas prices reached 240 euros per megawatt-hour in August 2022³⁶. European greenhouse gas emissions rose in the first half of 2022 for the first time in a decade, as coal-fired plants were brought back online and LNG tankers began crisscrossing the Atlantic to fill a gap that had, until weeks earlier, seemed impossible to imagine³⁷.

But the cruelest dimension of that crisis was not what it did to the wealthy economies of Western Europe, which possessed the fiscal space to absorb the shock, however painful. The cruelest dimension was what it did to the countries of the Global South. When European LNG demand surged, it crowded out supplies that had been destined for Latin America and Asia³⁸. When energy prices spiked, the cost was transmitted into food prices, transport costs, and inflation rates across import-dependent economies that had neither emergency reserves nor the institutional capacity to shield their populations. In 2022, for the first time in over a

³⁴ Brookings Institution, "Europe's Messy Russian Gas Divorce," March 2025, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/europes-messy-russian-gas-divorce/>.

³⁵ International Energy Agency, "Russia's War on Ukraine," accessed June 2026, <https://www.iea.org/topics/russias-war-on-ukraine>.

³⁶ PMC, "Environmental Impacts of Restructuring the EU's Natural Gas Supply," *PLOS ONE* (2025), <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11763217/>.

³⁷ Thijs Van de Graaf and Silvia Weko, "Weaponised Energy and Climate Change: Assessing Europe's Response to the Ukraine War," *LSE Public Policy Review* 3, no. 3 (2023), <https://ppr.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/lseppr.78>.

³⁸ CEPR, "The European Energy Crisis and the Consequences for the Global Natural Gas Market," accessed June 2026, <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/european-energy-crisis-and-consequences-global-natural-gas-market>.



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decade, the number of people worldwide without access to electricity actually increased (rising to 685 million)³⁹.

The world was still in recovery from its effects when another shock occurred. Indeed, while the 2026 shocks to global energy systems serve to prove what was suspected about the global energy transition in 2022, they confirm that the transition is too slow, too unjust, and too lacking in institutional coordination to ensure that energy is not again used as a weapon against those most at risk⁴⁰.

This agenda item represents a critically important aspect of the overall discussion, and one that has implications for global stability as well as the climate issue; hence, the need to re-examine our approach to building a multilateral system capable of providing a means to safely migrate from fossil fuels and at the same time reduce, rather than aggravate, the long-standing systemic inequality experienced by many countries due to the actions of others.

This question has been raised previously; however, it is unprecedentedly urgent. The global community has been discussing the establishment of a fair and long-term energy future for many years: via the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), by means of the Paris Climate Accord (Paris Agreement), through the Sustainable Development Goal #7 (SDG7), which seeks to guarantee that everyone has access to an affordable, dependable, sustainable, and modern energy supply. The evidence of 2020 has shown what 2022 has indicated, and now the evidence of 2026 has confirmed; namely, that the divergence between what we expect and what is occurring is far more than just a technical problem. It is a political challenge, a financial obstacle, and most critically, it is about the will to act as institutions such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) whether they possess the means to coordinate a collective response to the transformation of the world's energy systems.

Delegates to this committee have been tasked with fielding their thoughts on this question. Specifically, they are being asked to create a plan of action to regulate two things: a crisis in the whole, as well as developing legislation or policy governing specific individuals; or, rather, an example of that. By working on both sets of rules together, members can build optimal solutions while taking into consideration global realities for the millions of current

³⁹ IEA, IRENA, UNSD, World Bank, and WHO, *Tracking SDG7: The Energy Progress Report 2024* (June 2024), <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2024/06/press-release-energy-progress-report-2024>.

⁴⁰ Al Jazeera, "Global Energy Crisis Highlights Meagre Oil Buffers in Developing World," May 12, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/5/12/global-energy-crisis-highlights-meagre-oil-buffers-in-developing-world>.



and projected folks without access to electricity by 2030 based on current law and statute. Additionally, this project should focus on how and where green transition benefits are concentrated, since only 25 economies worldwide currently receive 80% of all funding for clean energy development. Also, the rationale for this committee addressing energy crises globally through multiple means of regulation is to ensure that new energy price shocks do not have a significant impact on any one group⁴¹.

In subsequent sections, delegates will be provided with tools for understanding how to meet the challenges presented by changes in the energy system being brought about by political change. We will explore structural weaknesses in the global energy system and political strategies used by the world's major powers to influence the options available to all others. We will identify financial, institutional, and normative connections where multilateral action will have the greatest impact. However, we will not provide the delegates with the political imagination that is required to achieve these objectives. In the end, what this agenda item requires is not only the technical expertise required to deliver results, but also the moral imperatives that accompany the loss of energy as a public good; the most disadvantaged people in society are forced to bear the greatest burden.

5. Understanding the Green Energy Transition and Its Role as a Pillar of International Stability: Contemporary Challenges and Geopolitical Risk Analysis within the ECOSOC Framework

The previous sections demonstrate that the physical structure that is the international legal framework establishing an organized way for the world's countries to cooperate in addressing a global existential threat is the most highly developed of any type of international cooperation that is/was developed by humankind. By 2026 it is clear that these frameworks continue to be under intense stress from the pace of technological advances, and from harsh realities resulting from great power distribution. To say that the world has been transformed since these structures were developed would be a profound understatement; the change is so profound that it is not possible for the architects of the Paris Agreement and their supporters

⁴¹ IEA, IRENA, UNSD, World Bank, and WHO, *Tracking SDG7: The Energy Progress Report 2024*.



to conceive of the manner in which an energy transition occurs simultaneously while being used as an instrument for international competition for the same energy resources.

The subsequent sections do not seek to document all aspects of the change occurring. What is being attempted is finding out where there are structural fault-lines within the global energy system and how those structural fault-lines have provided both urgency and difficulty to the transition from fossil fuels. Furthermore, this document will identify specific points of connection (or "nexuses") in ECOSOC's coordination of all actors involved that will allow for the greatest impact.

The analytical framework used in this paper proceeds from structural to geopolitical and from systemic to strategic, which is the order in which the crises have appeared. Knowing where the weaknesses of the global energy system exist is the basis for understanding why it fails.

5.1 Energy Arteries of the Global Economy and Structural Sensitivities Leading to Vulnerabilities

The global energy system, viewed from a sufficient altitude, is a marvel of human organization. Over the course of two centuries, humanity has constructed a network of extraction sites, processing facilities, pipelines, tanker routes, LNG terminals, and transmission grids that collectively moves more energy across greater distances, to more people, than any previous civilization could have conceived. In 2024, total global primary energy consumption reached a new record of 592 exajoules (a very large figure which defeats intuition)⁴². Every hospital that keeps its lights on through the night, every factory that runs its assembly line, every household that heats its water in the morning is, in some direct sense, a beneficiary of this system.

Elevation, in addition to providing a view of the physical layout of the global energy system, can also provide an illustration of how the system is vulnerable. Unlike other systems, where a significant amount of energy is distributed over distances, the global energy system consists of a few main nodes and a tremendous number of connections between those nodes, such that if these connections were to be disrupted, the results would be felt globally within days. With regard to resilience, the global energy system is a model that has been optimized for current throughput, at the cost of redundancy, through multiple crises on an almost daily basis.

⁴² Energy Institute, *Statistical Review of World Energy 2025* (London: Energy Institute, 2025), <https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review>.



5.1.1 Paradox of Capacity vs. Dependence in Global Energy Supply

The first structural paradox of the energy system is this: the world has never produced more energy, and yet has never been more vulnerable to energy disruption. In 2024, fossil fuels continued to supply 86.6% of total global primary energy⁴³. Wind and solar, for all their extraordinary growth (expanding by 16% in 2024 alone) met only 3.5% of total global energy demand⁴⁴. The shift towards greener practices is authentic and happening at a fast pace yet it is still being implemented on top of a growing level of fossil fuel consumption that still is increasing, specifically from developing countries in Asia where currently the majority (or four fifths) of the energy demand growth is being generated⁴⁵.

Capacity and dependence represent two key paradoxes in energy supply today. While the amount of renewable energy produced globally has increased dramatically over recent years, the amount of fossil fuel consumed throughout the globe has similarly also reached record levels. As a result, rather than transitioning from fossil fuels to renewables, there has been a layering effect; as such, there is now a new 'layer' of renewable energy developing on top of the existing infrastructure of fossil fuels without the layered renewable energy yet displacing the underlying fossil fuel infrastructures. Because there has been no reduction in fossil fuel consumption globally, many of the structural dependencies that made the 2022 Russia–Ukraine energy crisis so catastrophic are still in place; i.e., Europe's dependency on Russian pipeline gas; Asia's dependency on oil from the Middle East; and, the Global South's dependency on fuels that are purchased in financial markets that don't have any controls or transparency for end-users. According to the IEA's own estimates of future energy supply and demand, approximately 66% of near-future total global energy demand will continue to be provided by fossil fuels under current energy supply and demand and other energy-related policies⁴⁶. Even though transition is happening, it is not happening fast enough, or equitably enough, to dissolve the dependencies that make energy a permanent instrument of geopolitical leverage.

⁴³ Ibid.; Visual Capitalist, "What Powered the World in 2024?," August 2025, <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/what-powered-the-world-in-2024/>.

⁴⁴ Visual Capitalist, "Global Energy Demand by Fuel Type (2024–2050P)," December 2025, <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/global-energy-demand-by-fuel-type-2024-2050p/>.

⁴⁵ IEA, *Global Energy Review 2025* (Paris: IEA, 2025), <https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2025/global-trends>.

⁴⁶ IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2024: Executive Summary* (Paris: IEA, 2024), <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024/executive-summary>.



5.1.2 ECOSOC's Dilemma: From Fossil Fuel Lock-In to Transition Despair

The global economy experiences the relationship between dependence and capacity differently. For wealthy economies, it is a challenge of policy; how can we speed up an already occurring transition? For developing countries, which are the countries that fall under the label of ECOSOC and directly related to ECOSOC's development mandate, it is a much tougher situation because both the green transition (and) continued dependence on fossil fuels present existential threats.

This trap has a name in the academic literature: fossil fuel lock-in⁴⁷. It refers to the condition of economies in which the physical infrastructure, the fiscal architecture, and the political economy of fossil fuel production and consumption have become so deeply entrenched that transition is structurally impeded even when it is nominally desired. In Nigeria and South Africa, for example, coal and gas infrastructure represents not only the backbone of the electricity system but a major source of government revenue and formal employment — making rapid phase-out a threat to fiscal stability and social cohesion simultaneously⁴⁸. In Colombia, a country that has halted new oil and gas licences and formally committed to transition, fossil fuel revenues remain the primary mechanism for servicing a \$265 billion public debt — meaning that the faster the country transitions, the less capacity it has to fund the transition itself⁴⁹.

Furthermore, the 'ongoing investment into fossil fuel infrastructure' alternative comes with its own catastrophic risk of stranded assets. This risk is not theoretical. As the global climate policy continues to tighten and renewable energy prices continue to decline, there is a growing prospect that fossil fuel assets in the Global South will experience increased stranding risk, meaning that infrastructure built today becomes economically unviable before its expected operational lifespan concludes⁵⁰. The result is a double bind from which no purely technical solution escapes: invest in fossil fuels and risk stranded assets; invest in renewables and risk fiscal collapse in the absence of adequate transition finance.

For ECOSOC, this dilemma is the central development challenge of the energy transition. And it is rendered more acute by a financing landscape that is almost perversely misaligned with need. Of the approximately \$2 trillion currently invested globally in clean energy, only

⁴⁷ Irene Heras et al., "Fossil Fuels, Stranded Assets, and the Energy Transition in the Global South," *WIREs Climate Change* 15, no. 1 (2024), <https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcc.866>.

⁴⁸ *Frontiers in Sustainability*, "Sustainable Energy Transition towards Decarbonization among Developing Countries," September 2025, <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/sustainability/articles/10.3389/frsus.2025.1641299/full>.

⁴⁹ *Climate Change News*, "To Phase Out Fossil Fuels, Developing Countries Need Exit Route from 'Debt Trap,'" April 22, 2026, <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2026/04/22/to-phase-out-fossil-fuels-developing-countries-need-exit-route-from-debt-trap/>.

⁵⁰ Heras et al., "Fossil Fuels, Stranded Assets."



15% reaches the Global South, excluding China⁵¹. In 2024, emerging markets and developing economies received only 15 cents of every clean energy dollar spent globally⁵². For every dollar invested in battery storage in advanced economies and China in 2023, just one cent was invested in other emerging and developing economies⁵³. The green transition, as currently financed, is not a global project. It is a club of wealthy nations, expanding slowly and unevenly at its margins, while the structural vulnerabilities it was designed to address deepen in precisely the countries that can least afford to absorb them.

5.1.3 The Geography of Fragility: A Double-Ended Energy Squeeze

The structural vulnerabilities described above do not exist in the abstract. They are embedded in a specific geography which being a map of energy flows, production centers, and transit corridors whose configuration determines not merely economic efficiency, but political leverage. To understand where the global energy system breaks, one must first understand where it bends: the physical chokepoints, concentration nodes, and supply dependencies that make disruption not a matter of possibility but of when.

The geography of global energy is, above all, a geography of concentration. On the supply side, four countries (the United States, Russia, Iran, and China) together account for 53% of global natural gas production⁵⁴. The majority of the world's proven oil reserves are concentrated in a handful of Gulf states whose political stability cannot be taken for granted and whose strategic choices are increasingly shaped by great-power competition rather than multilateral norms. On the demand side, the Asia-Pacific region drove 68% of global energy demand growth in 2024, with the growth in India alone exceeding the combined increase of all advanced economies⁵⁵. This concentration of demand in a region that is simultaneously the most import-dependent and the most exposed to supply disruptions from Middle Eastern chokepoints creates what might be called a structural seismic zone in the global energy system: a region where the tectonic plates of supply, demand, and geopolitics grind against one another with increasing friction.

⁵¹ World Economic Forum, "Why Scaling Clean Energy in the Global South Is a Three-Legged Balancing Act," January 2025, <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/01/clean-energy-renewables-global-south/>.

⁵² World Resources Institute, "Global Energy Trends: Clean Energy Growth and Rising Demand," accessed June 2026, <https://www.wri.org/insights/state-clean-energy-charted>.

⁵³ IEA, *World Energy Investment 2024: Overview and Key Findings* (Paris: IEA, 2024), <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2024/overview-and-key-findings>.

⁵⁴ Energy Institute, *Statistical Review of World Energy 2025*.

⁵⁵ IEA, *Global Energy Review 2025*.



This geographic fragility operates at two ends simultaneously. At the supply end, producing regions face the double pressure of geopolitical weaponization which Russia already demonstrated in 2022 and the longer-term threat of transition-induced demand destruction, which leaves fossil fuel-dependent economies scrambling to monetize reserves before they become stranded. At the demand end, import-dependent economies (from Germany before REPowerEU, to Japan, South Korea, and the small island developing states of the Pacific) face the vulnerability of price exposure to markets they do not control, transit routes they cannot defend, and political relationships they cannot predict.

It is between these two ends of the squeeze that the most economically fragile populations are trapped. When a gas supply disruption raises European energy prices, the second-order effects (on LNG availability for Asian markets, on global food prices linked to energy-intensive agriculture, on the fiscal space of import-dependent developing economies) are felt most severely by those who had no role in creating the disruption and no institutional voice in managing its consequences⁵⁶.

5.1.4 The Bottlenecks of Pipeline Infrastructure and LNG Terminals: Globalism's Biggest Choke Points

If the geography of fragility describes the system's broad vulnerabilities, its pipeline and LNG infrastructure describes the specific anatomical points at which those vulnerabilities become critical. The global gas network is not a seamless grid. It is a collection of corridors, each with its own chokepoints, each capable of transmitting disruption across the entire system when it fails.

The pipeline system, for all its apparent permanence, has revealed itself to be a deeply political infrastructure. Nord Stream 1 and 2 which the arteries that once carried Russian gas under the Baltic Sea to Germany, representing the most direct link between Siberian reserves and European markets, became the clearest demonstration that pipeline dependency is geopolitical dependency with a geographic address⁵⁷. When Russia cut 80 billion cubic metres of pipeline gas supplies to Europe following its invasion of Ukraine, European regas capacity (the terminals capable of receiving LNG from alternative suppliers) became the vital bottleneck. Western Europe rushed to expand regasification infrastructure, with the number of

⁵⁶ CEPR, "The European Energy Crisis and the Consequences for the Global Natural Gas Market," accessed June 2026, <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/european-energy-crisis-and-consequences-global-natural-gas-market>.

⁵⁷ Brookings Institution, "Europe's Messy Russian Gas Divorce," March 2025, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/europes-messy-russian-gas-divorce/>.



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terminals of medium capacity growing by 72% between 2019 and 2024⁵⁸. But this expansion was uneven, emergency-driven, and structurally incomplete: Germany, despite rapid construction of new import facilities, found that connecting pipelines between coastal terminals and inland networks remained insufficient for winter demand scenarios, leaving the country functionally operating as a collection of energy sub-markets rather than a unified system⁵⁹.

The LNG alternative that Europe turned to in desperation also carries its own structural vulnerabilities and its own geographic concentration risks. LNG markets operate globally, meaning that European demand surges directly crowd out supply available to Latin America and Asia⁶⁰. In 2025, approximately 78% of all Middle Eastern crude oil exports to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan flowed through a single maritime chokepoint: the Strait of Hormuz⁶¹. A system that routes this volume of energy through a channel barely 33 kilometres wide at its narrowest point is not merely a logistical network; it is a geopolitical pressure point of the first order. For ECOSOC, these infrastructure realities carry a specific developmental implication that goes beyond the immediate disruption of energy flows. The global gas infrastructure expansion triggered by the 2022 crisis — new LNG terminals, new pipelines, new floating storage and regasification units deployed as emergency measures and now operating beyond their intended timelines — risks locking the global energy system into a new generation of fossil fuel dependency precisely when the transition demands the opposite⁶². New LNG import infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, is currently connected to projects building 2,652 kilometres of new gas transmission pipelines and 19.3 gigawatts of new gas-fired power capacity — investments whose economic logic makes sense in the short term but whose long-term effect is to extend the fossil fuel era in regions that could, with adequate transition finance, leapfrog directly to renewable systems⁶³. The infrastructure of emergency has become the infrastructure of lock-in. And ECOSOC must recognize that in the absence of decisive multilateral intervention, the bottlenecks of today's gas system will become the stranded assets of tomorrow's climate reckoning.

⁵⁸ PwC, "Navigating the Future of LNG: Strategy, Supply and Global Demand Shift," accessed June 2026, <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/energy-utilities-resources/library/future-of-lng.html>.

⁵⁹ MEXC, "LNG Reliance Creates New Market Vulnerabilities," accessed June 2026, <https://www.mexc.com/news/681678>.

⁶⁰ CEPR, "European Energy Crisis and Global Natural Gas Market."

⁶¹ Atlantic Council, "What a Middle East Oil and LNG Crisis Means for China and East Asia," March 5, 2026, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-a-middle-east-oil-and-lng-crisis-means-for-china-and-east-asia/>.

⁶² Global Energy Monitor, *Global Gas Infrastructure Tracker* (November 2025), <https://globalenergymonitor.org/projects/global-gas-infrastructure-tracker>.

⁶³ Global Energy Monitor, *LNG 2024: Latin America and the Caribbean Edition* (October 2024), <https://globalenergymonitor.org/report/lng-2024-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-edition/>.



5.1.4.1 Arterial Cardiac Arrest: Geopolitics as a Global Energy Handbrake

The structural fragilities previously described give context to the ongoing condition of the global energy system. The events of 2022/'23 and 2026 represent acute episodes - moments of changing chronic vulnerability into acute collapse - when the abstractions of structural analysis turn into concrete forms of human suffering. The infrastructure bottlenecks discussed above - pipeline corridors, LNG terminal locations, regasification choke points - are not simply engineering issues but rather the exact anatomical locations at which geopolitics intervenes in the global economy and stops it in its tracks have now become apparent to the world twice within four years.

What sets the current energy crises apart from those experienced during the previous century is the structure of the two crises. The oil shocks in the 1970s were caused by OPEC member countries reducing their levels of production due to geopolitical factors. However, the issues in the last few years are much more serious in scope and nature, as they have involved deliberately targeting strategic energy infrastructure assets, such as pipelines and other choke points, which are integral components of the global energy supply framework and which have resulted in a total collapse of the globalized liberal energy order that had been anticipated for decades⁶⁴. In a very direct manner, an assessment of the 2026 conjuncture reached the conclusion that the goal of the forces attempting to reshape the global energy system is "a fragmented world in which energy becomes a method of bilateral coercion and the rules-based international order has been superseded by pure transactional strength."⁶⁵ It is in this context that the two crises analyzed below must be understood.

5.1.4.2 The 2022 Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis and Global Structural Shocks

On February 24, 2022, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine did something that decades of European energy policy had been designed to prevent: it converted a commercial relationship into a weapon. The Kremlin's sharpest instrument was natural gas — delivered by the state-backed monopolist Gazprom via the Nord Stream, Yamal, and TurkStream pipelines that had, for decades, been simultaneously the arteries of European energy security and the

⁶⁴ Kirsten Westphal et al., "Governing the Global Energy Transformation," *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* (2020), <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7281855/>.

⁶⁵ Jennifer Morgan, "The Future of Global Energy Cooperation," Heinrich Böll Stiftung, May 20, 2026, <https://www.boell.de/en/2026/05/20/future-global-energy-cooperation-energy-dominance-vs-sustainable-energy-partnerships>.



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institutional expression of an assumption that mutual economic dependence precluded armed conflict⁶⁶. That assumption did not survive the first week of the invasion.

Between May and October 2022, Russia cut gas flows to the European Union by approximately 80%, eliminating nearly 80 billion cubic metres of annual pipeline supply and triggering what the IEA would describe as "the first truly global energy crisis, with impacts that will be felt for years to come."⁶⁷ The immediate consequences for European markets were staggering: natural gas prices reached all-time highs, electricity costs spiked across the continent, and the Eurozone's inflation rate soared to 8.5% in March 2022 alone⁶⁸. Some gas-intensive manufacturing plants in Europe decreased their outputs because they could no longer afford to operate. The months that followed amounted to a stress test of the entire post-war European energy architecture, and unfortunately the architecture failed it.

What makes the 2022 crisis analytically significant for ECOSOC delegates, however, is not its impact on Europe. The disruption started in one small place, but it triggered a domino effect that messed up the whole global economy. The damage was way bigger than anyone expected from a local issue. When Europe's demand for LNG surged to replace Russian pipeline gas (LNG's share of EU gas supply rising from an average of 12% in the 2010s to nearly 35% by end of the 2022) it effectively crowded out LNG cargoes that had been destined for Latin America and Asia⁶⁹. The shift in global LNG flows wasn't just a normal market change. Rich countries caused a crisis and then used their money to grab all the gas, leaving poorer nations who had nothing to do with the problem, to suffer the shortage.

The consequences for the Global South were severe and asymmetric. Rising global energy prices translated directly into higher food costs, since energy is a primary input across food supply chains from fertilizer production to irrigation to transport. Developing economies saw extreme poverty increase and progress toward universal energy access reverse⁷⁰. According to IEA analysis, 70 million people who had recently gained access to electricity could no longer afford it in the aftermath of the crisis; 100 million more may have returned to biomass cooking fuels. Research covering 19 developing countries estimated that the combined

⁶⁶ Brookings, "Europe's Messy Russian Gas Divorce."

⁶⁷ IEA, "2022 Energy Crisis"; WEF, "6 Ways the Ukraine War and Energy Crisis Reshaped the World," November 2022, <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2022/11/russia-ukraine-invasion-global-energy-crisis/>.

⁶⁸ PMC, "Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Soaring International Energy Prices."

⁶⁹ Global Security, "Russian Natural Gas — 2022 War."

⁷⁰ IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2022*.



commodity price shocks of 2022 pushed approximately 27.2 million additional people into poverty and 22.3 million into hunger⁷¹.

5.1.4.3 The 2026 Global Energy Shocks: The Sunset of the Liberal Energy Order?

If 2022 was a warning, 2026 is the reckoning. On February 28, 2026, a joint U.S.-Israeli military offensive targeting Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure (Operation Epic Fury) triggered a retaliatory response from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that transformed the Strait of Hormuz from a transit corridor into a battlefield⁷². The IRGC's deployment of sea mines, drone swarms, and anti-ship missile systems brought commercial traffic through the world's most consequential energy chokepoint to a functional halt. Through this 21-mile-wide waterway had flowed, as of early 2026, approximately 15 million barrels per day of crude oil, 5.5 million barrels of refined products, and 35% of all seaborne LNG exports which represents approximately 20% of globally traded oil and one-fifth of the world's daily energy supply⁷³.

The initial market response was immediate off course. In the first 72 hours, Brent crude surged 7.5% to \$83.58 per barrel and continued rising through March, breaching \$101 per barrel by March 12 and threatening to push toward \$115 under extended disruption scenarios⁷⁴. The IEA's Executive Director Fatih Birol framed the crisis with unusual starkness, describing it as "the greatest global energy security challenge in history" which was analytically significant because it represents a judgment that the 2026 shock surpassed the combined severity of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, the daily volumes of oil lost to global markets in March 2026 exceeding the peak supply losses of those two shocks combined⁷⁵.

For the major Asian importing economies that depend on Hormuz for the overwhelming share of their energy supply (Japan sourcing 95% of its crude through this corridor, South Korea 75%, and China approximately half) the closure represented what can only be described as an

⁷¹ PMC, "Ukraine War and Rising Commodity Prices."

⁷² Financial Content Markets, "Global Energy Shock: Brent Surges to \$83.58 as Iran Seals the Strait of Hormuz," March 3, 2026, <https://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-3-global-energy-shock-brent-surges-to-8358-as-iran-seals-the-strait-of-hormuz>.

⁷³ Al Habtoor Research Centre, "The Hormuz Inflection: Oil Markets After the Iran Strikes," March 8, 2026, <https://www.habtoorresearch.com/programmes/hormuz-oil-iran-strikes/>.

⁷⁴ Financial Content Markets, "Global Energy Shock: Wall Street Reeling as Hormuz Closure Drives Brent Past \$100," March 12, 2026, <https://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-12-global-energy-shock-wall-street-reeling-as-hormuz-closure-drives-brent-past-100>.

⁷⁵ Modern Diplomacy, "Global Energy Shock Deepens as IEA Warns of Crisis Beyond Historical Precedents," April 7, 2026, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/04/07/global-energy-shock-deepens-as-iea-warns-of-crisis-beyond-historical-precedents/>; IEA, "Energy Crisis Threatens World's Most Vulnerable as Cooking Fuel Shortages Grow," May 2026, <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/energy-crisis-threatens-world-s-most-vulnerable-as-cooking-fuel-shortages-grow>.



industrial emergency⁷⁶. Yet as in 2022, the sharpest impacts were not borne by the largest economies, which possessed emergency reserves, fiscal buffers, and institutional voice. They were borne by the developing world. With global fuel prices more than doubling relative to the 2025 average and fertilizer prices projected to remain 15 to 20% higher through the first half of 2026, the UN's own assessment projected that more than 32 million additional people were at risk of being pushed into poverty as a direct consequence of the combined energy and food price shock⁷⁷. In developing economies, inflation was projected to average 5.1% in 2026⁷⁸.

Think of the global energy system not as a tight-knit team that hit a bump in the road, but as a group that was already breaking up. The 2026 crisis just shattered it completely. Before the crisis even hit, countries were building walls—using trade limits and screening investments to protect their own pockets. It completely changed the game: energy isn't just about supply and demand anymore. It's a strategy game where if you depend on another country for power, they own you⁷⁹. In this environment, the crisis accelerated a dynamic that was already underway: the retreat of major powers from shared multilateral energy commitments toward bilateral energy deals, strategic reserves, and national supply chain security — all pursued at the expense of the cooperative frameworks that alone can protect the most vulnerable economies from the consequences of disruptions they did not cause and cannot prevent.

6. The ECOSOC Mandate: A Multidimensional SDG Framework for Energy Stability

At first glance, things like fossil fuel dependency or blocked pipelines seem like problems for engineers and politicians. We talk about tankers and terminals, but we forget that these are actually questions about human lives. We are talking about whether a mom in Nairobi can cook for her kids tonight, or whether a hospital can save lives when the power goes out. We are talking about teenagers wondering if they even have a future.

This is why ECOSOC matters. It does not handle the technical stuff, but it asks the most important human question: who suffers when things go wrong? We use the SDGs because

⁷⁶ Financial Content Markets, "Asia's Energy Lifeline Severed: The Strait of Hormuz Blockade and the 2026 Global Economic Crisis," March 4, 2026,

<https://markets.financialcontent.com/stocks/article/marketminute-2026-3-4-asias-energy-lifeline-severed-the-strait-of-hormuz-blockade-and-t-he-2026-global-economic-crisis>.

⁷⁷ UN News, "Global Energy and Trade Disruption Pushing Millions towards Poverty," May 2026,

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/05/1167526>.

⁷⁸ World Bank, "Middle East War to Spark Biggest Energy Price Surge in Four Years," April 28, 2026,

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/04/28/commodity-markets-outlook-april-2026-press-release>.

⁷⁹ Slaughter and May, "Geopolitics of the Energy Transition," January 2026,

<https://www.slaughterandmay.com/horizon-scanning/2026/energy-transition/geopolitics-of-the-energy-transition/>.



they help us speak for the people who have no voice in this crisis. The economic shocks did not hit everyone the same way. Some goals were destroyed instantly, while others are slowly breaking down. This chapter is here to look past the numbers, see the real human impact, and find a way to fix it.

6.1 The Inflation Shadow on Human Dignity (SDGs 1, 2, and 7)

An energy crisis hits people the hardest through their wallets. When energy costs go up because a pipeline is cut or a refinery is attacked, the price of literally everything else goes up too. Think about the food we eat. It needs natural gas for fertilizers, electricity for water pumps, diesel for tractors, and fuel for the trucks that bring it to the supermarket. When the 2022 crisis made gas prices in Europe skyrocket, it did not just close down rich factories in Germany. It also shut down fertilizer plants and made shipping costs explode. The real victims were families in countries like Mozambique and Bangladesh. They had no idea what Nord Stream even was, but they felt its consequences every single time they tried to buy groceries⁸⁰.

The numbers are not abstract. The 2022 energy and food price shock pushed an estimated 71 million people into poverty, with the heaviest concentration in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia⁸¹. In 2022, for the first time in over a decade, the global number of people without electricity access increased; not because governments stopped building grids, but because the energy crisis made electricity unaffordable for millions who nominally had access to it⁸². The 2026 Hormuz crisis compounded this trajectory: with global fuel prices more than doubling relative to 2025 averages and fertilizer prices 15 to 20% higher, the UN projected that 32 million additional people faced poverty as a direct consequence⁸³.

What makes this particularly relevant to ECOSOC's mandate is the structural pattern it reveals: the people who suffer most from energy price shocks are not those who consume the most energy. They are those who spend the highest proportion of their income on energy and food (the poor and near-poor of import-dependent economies) and who have the least institutional capacity to absorb the blow. SDG 7's aspiration to ensure affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all is not a separate goal from SDG 1 (No Poverty) or

⁸⁰ PMC, "Environmental Impacts of Restructuring the EU's Natural Gas Supply."

⁸¹ UNDP, "Addressing the Cost-of-Living Crisis in Developing Countries," July 2022, <https://www.undp.org/publications/addressing-cost-living-crisis-developing-countries-poverty-and-vulnerability-projections-and-policy-responses>.

⁸² IEA, IRENA, UNSD, World Bank, and WHO, *Tracking SDG7: The Energy Progress Report 2024*.

⁸³ UN News, "Global Energy and Trade Disruption Pushing Millions towards Poverty."



SDG 2 (Zero Hunger). It is their foundation. When energy becomes unaffordable, poverty and hunger follow with a reliability that no development program has yet managed to interrupt without addressing the energy system itself.

6.2 Structural Inequality and the Infrastructure Gap (SDGs 9 and 10)

High prices are the quick pain of an energy crisis, but the lack of infrastructure is the real root of the problem. Developing countries are deeply hurt by global price jumps, and it is not because they do not have energy resources. In fact, many of them have endless sunshine and wind. The real issue is that they simply do not have the equipment to use them. They lack the power grids to send electricity, the massive batteries to store power when the sun is not shining, and the technical skills to maintain modern tech. Most importantly, they lack the money to buy or build any of it.

The numbers here are similarly stark. Developing countries need approximately \$1.7 trillion annually in clean energy investment to stay on a transition-compatible pathway — but in 2022, they attracted only \$544 billion⁸⁴. More than 30 developing countries have not registered a single international investment in utility-scale renewable energy since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015⁸⁵. The total SDG investment gap across all sectors has grown to over \$4 trillion per year — with energy, water, and transport infrastructure representing the largest deficits⁸⁶. In battery storage alone, for every dollar invested in advanced economies and China in 2023, just one cent reached other emerging and developing economies⁸⁷.

This is not merely an efficiency problem. It is an inequality problem of the first order, one that SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) places squarely within ECOSOC's mandate. A world in which the green transition concentrates its benefits in the 25 countries that receive 80% of clean energy investment while the remaining economies absorb the costs of energy volatility is not transitioning equitably; it is creating a new hierarchy of energy haves and have-nots, structured this time around renewable capacity rather than fossil fuel reserves. As the analysis in section 5.1.2 established, the combination of fossil fuel lock-in and inadequate transition finance traps developing economies in a double bind from which no domestic policy alone can offer an exit. The infrastructure gap is not a gap that individual governments can close. It

⁸⁴ UNCTAD, "UNCTAD Calls for Urgent Support to Developing Countries," July 5, 2023, <https://unctad.org/news/unctad-calls-urgent-support-developing-countries-attract-massive-investment-clean-energy>.

⁸⁵ UNSDG, "Developing Countries Face Staggering \$4 Trillion Investment Gap in SDGs," accessed June 2026, <https://unsdg.un.org/latest/stories/developing-countries-face-staggering-4-trillion-investment-gap-sdgs>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ IEA, *World Energy Investment 2024*.



requires exactly the kind of multilateral financial coordination that ECOSOC is mandated to facilitate.

6.3 The Environmental Paradox and Resource Stewardship (SDGs 13 and 15)

The green transition was supposed to save us from the climate crisis. In many ways it does because solar and wind energy do not create carbon emissions, electric cars do not pollute the air, and green power means we can grow without burning oil. But this clean future has a hidden side that people are finally starting to admit. Building all of this requires a massive amount of minerals like lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, and graphite. Getting these materials out of the ground causes its own serious damage to nature and to the local communities living near the mines.

Meeting global climate targets will require a ninefold increase in lithium demand and a doubling of cobalt and nickel demand by 2040⁸⁸. These minerals are disproportionately concentrated in the Global South — in the lithium triangle of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile, in the cobalt deposits of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the copper belts of Zambia and Peru. Their extraction involves open-pit mining that degrades surrounding land, contaminates groundwater, and consumes immense volumes of water in some of the world's most water-scarce regions. In the DRC, cobalt mining has been linked to child labor and displacement of local communities. In Chile, lithium extraction in the Atacama desert is depleting water sources that indigenous communities depend on for survival. The clean energy revolution, as currently organized, risks reproducing the colonial-era pattern of resource extraction: the ecological and social costs borne by the Global South, the technological and economic benefits captured by the Global North⁹⁰.

6.4 Closing the Enforcement Gap: Institutions and Partnership (SDGs 16 and 17)

There is a final dimension of the energy governance crisis that the preceding sections have circled without naming directly: the enforcement gap. The rules, frameworks, and commitments that are supposed to govern the global energy system — the Paris Agreement's NDC architecture, the UNFCCC's transparency mechanisms, the sanctions regimes designed

⁸⁸ Down to Earth, "Who Really Pays for the Green Energy Transition?," April 29, 2026,

<https://www.downtoearth.org/in/energy/paradox-of-energy-transition-who-really-pays-for-a-greener-future>.

⁸⁹ IEA, "The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions: Executive Summary," accessed June 2026,

<https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary>.

⁹⁰ Global Society, "Critical Minerals Are Reshaping the Clean Energy Transition and Global Power," May 7, 2026,

<https://www.globalsociety.earth/post/critical-minerals-are-reshaping-the-clean-energy-transition-and-global-power>.



to prevent the weaponization of fossil fuels — are only as effective as the institutions capable of implementing and enforcing them. And those institutions, as 2022 and 2026 have demonstrated, are operating under severe and growing strain.

The shadow fleet is perhaps the clearest single symbol of this gap. As of the third quarter of 2025, over 1,900 vessels were identified as operating as part of the global dark fleet — tankers that disable their tracking systems, falsify documentation, and use shell company ownership structures to transport sanctioned Russian and Iranian oil while evading international oversight⁹¹. These vessels do not merely undermine sanctions regimes. They undermine the entire principle that energy trade should be governed by transparent, enforceable rules rather than by the capacity of individual actors to exploit regulatory opacity. Every barrel of sanctioned oil delivered by a dark fleet tanker is a data point in the argument that international law is optional for those with the means to circumvent it — an argument that erodes the normative foundations of SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) directly.

The deeper institutional problem, however, is not the shadow fleet in isolation. It is the fragmentation of the governance architecture that allows it to thrive. As established in section 5.1.4.1, the global energy governance landscape is populated by institutions of genuine expertise — the IEA, IRENA, the IMO, the UNFCCC — that do not systematically share data, coordinate enforcement, or speak with one institutional voice when crises demand a unified response⁹². No single country or body can close this gap alone. It requires exactly the kind of inter-agency coordination, capacity-building support for weaker states, and multilateral partnership that SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) was designed to mandate — and that only a body with ECOSOC's horizontal coordinative authority can credibly organize. The enforcement gap is not a technical failure. It is a political choice, and reversing it requires political will of precisely the kind that multilateral bodies exist to generate.

7. Strategic Policy Pathways: ECOSOC's Multilateral Response to Energy Fragmentation

The crises of 2022 and 2026 did not simply expose vulnerabilities in the global energy system. They exposed the consequences of governing that system as if it were primarily a technical or commercial matter rather than a question of collective human welfare. The SDG

⁹¹ Windward, "What Is the Dark Fleet?," January 2026, <https://windward.ai/blog/what-is-the-dark-fleet/>.

⁹² Westphal et al., "Governing the Global Energy Transformation."



framework analyzed in Chapter 6 makes clear that when pipelines fail, when chokepoints are blocked, and when transition finance flows to the wrong places, the human cost is not distributed randomly — it falls heaviest on those who had the least say in building the system in the first place.

ECOSOC cannot prevent wars. It cannot command armies or compel great powers to honor international law when it is inconvenient for them to do so. What it can do and what the crises of this decade have made urgently necessary, is build the institutional scaffolding that makes the global energy system more resilient, more equitable, and harder to weaponize. The four pathways outlined below are not a wish list. They are specific, actionable directions grounded in existing frameworks, real precedents, and gaps that ECOSOC is uniquely positioned to close. Each connects directly to what has come before in this study guide: the structural vulnerabilities of 5.1, the crises of 5.1.4, and the human stakes of Chapter 6.

7.1 Reforming the Global Green Finance Architecture: Beyond the Bridgetown Logic (SDGs 1, 13, and 17)

The most immediate policy gap exposed by the 2022 and 2026 crises is financial. Developing economies need approximately \$1.7 trillion annually in clean energy investment. However they receive less than a third of that⁹³. This gap is not simply a shortage of money in the world. The world invested over \$2 trillion in clean energy in 2024 alone. The gap is a structural problem: the money exists, but it flows to the wrong places, in the wrong forms, on the wrong terms.

The Bridgetown Initiative, launched by Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley at COP27 in 2022 and updated to version 3.0 in 2024, represents the most politically credible attempt to name and address this structural problem⁹⁴. Its core argument is simple: the global financial architecture was designed for a different world, and in its current form it cannot deliver the capital flows that vulnerable economies need to both absorb climate shocks and build clean energy systems. The Initiative has already yielded concrete results, the IMF launched a \$40 billion Resilience and Sustainability Trust Fund in 2022, partly in response to Bridgetown's

⁹³ UNCTAD, "UNCTAD Calls for Urgent Support to Developing Countries."

⁹⁴ Bridgetown Initiative, *Bridgetown Initiative 3.0* (September 2024),

https://www.bridgetown-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/SY043_Bridgetown-Initiative-3-0.pdf



demands, and multilateral development banks have begun reforming their capital adequacy frameworks to unlock additional lending⁹⁵.

But Bridgetown, as its architects acknowledge, remains incomplete. It was designed primarily around climate vulnerability and disaster response, not around the developmental consequences of energy price shocks of the kind the world experienced in 2022 and 2026. ECOSOC's contribution should be to extend the Bridgetown logic into the energy security domain — to argue, through its coordination mandate under the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda, that maritime energy disruption constitutes a systemic development risk deserving dedicated financial mechanisms, not merely emergency relief. Concretely, this means pushing for the inclusion of energy shock clauses in debt instruments — automatic debt service suspensions triggered by demonstrable energy price shocks above defined thresholds — and for the channeling of revenues from the IMO's emerging shipping decarbonization framework into a dedicated fund for LDC and SIDS energy infrastructure.

7.2 Digital Sovereignty and Radical Transparency: Dissolving the Shadow Nexus (SDGs 9 and 16)

The shadow fleet analyzed in section 6.4 is not merely a sanctions enforcement problem. It is a transparency problem; and transparency problems, as the digital economy has demonstrated, are increasingly solvable with the right institutional architecture and political will. As of late 2025, over 1,900 dark fleet vessels were operating globally, transporting sanctioned oil from Russia and Iran while disabling their tracking systems, falsifying ownership records, and exploiting the opacity of flag-of-convenience registries to evade accountability⁹⁶. ECOSOC's response should be to make those blind spots smaller. The practical instrument is a Global Energy Trade Transparency Protocol, a digital public infrastructure, modeled on the principles articulated in the UN's Global Digital Compact, that standardizes the disclosure of beneficial ownership, cargo origin, flag history, insurance status, and route integrity across jurisdictions⁹⁷. This is not a novel idea; it is an extension of accountability frameworks that already exist in fragmented form across the IMO, UNCTAD, and various national registries. What is missing is the inter-agency institutional architecture to make them interoperable and enforceable.

⁹⁵ Dialogue Earth, "Bridgetown at 3: Is the Initiative from Barbados Reforming Finance?," June 2025, <https://dialogue.earth/en/climate/bridgetown-at-3-is-the-initiative-from-barbados-reforming-finance/>.

⁹⁶ Windward, "What Is the Dark Fleet?"

⁹⁷ United Nations, "Global Digital Compact," accessed June 2026, <https://www.un.org/global-digital-compact/en>.



The Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) (multilateral platforms between developed and emerging economies designed to finance coal phase-out and renewable deployment) offer a useful governance model here. Despite their limitations, including the U.S. withdrawal from several partnerships in early 2025 and slow disbursement rates, JETPs have demonstrated that structured conditionality, linking finance to measurable policy commitments, can work when the institutional scaffolding is adequate and the political commitment is sustained⁹⁸. ECOSOC should advocate for a similar conditionality logic applied to energy trade transparency: access to multilateral financing facilities and development-oriented trade corridors should be progressively conditioned on participation in the transparency protocol, creating market incentives for compliance that supplement the limited enforcement capacity of any single multilateral body.

7.3 The Socio-Ecological Contract: Operationalizing a Just Transition and Collective Benefit-Sharing (SDGs 10 and 13)

The environmental paradox identified in section 6.3, that the green transition threatens to reproduce colonial-era patterns of resource extraction in the Global South, cannot be addressed through transparency alone. It requires a fundamentally different relationship between the economies that consume the products of critical mineral extraction and the communities that bear its costs. That relationship needs a name, a legal form, and an institutional home. ECOSOC is uniquely positioned to provide all three.

The conceptual foundation already exists. The Paris Agreement's CBDR-RC principle establishes that the burdens and benefits of climate action should be distributed according to both shared responsibility and unequal capacity. What has been missing is the translation of this principle into operational mechanisms for the specific domain of critical mineral governance. The demand for lithium, cobalt, and nickel required by the green transition will grow ninefold or more by 2040; the communities whose land and water systems are disrupted by their extraction deserve more than a percentage of royalty revenues and an environmental impact assessment conducted by the same company doing the mining⁹⁹.

ECOSOC should advocate for a mandatory benefit-sharing framework for critical mineral supply chains This connects directly to SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) because the current

⁹⁸ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The Just Energy Transition Partnership Crossroads," October 2025, <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/10/the-just-energy-transition-partnership-crossroads>.

⁹⁹ Down to Earth, "Who Really Pays for the Green Energy Transition?"



architecture (in which China controls approximately 80% of critical mineral processing while the mines themselves are overwhelmingly located in the Global South) reproduces the structural inequality of the fossil fuel era in clean technology form¹⁰⁰. A just transition is not simply a transition away from coal. It is a transition toward an energy system whose benefits are distributed as broadly as its costs.

7.4 Normative Gravity: Establishing a Mandatory Energy Transition ESG Framework (SDG 17)

The first three solutions have a big problem because they rely on companies and countries that prefer doing things voluntarily instead of being held responsible. This is why the fourth solution is the one that actually gives the others real power. It is all about creating rules that are so strong and credible that breaking them becomes too expensive, forcing everyone to change their behavior. We are already seeing this happen with green laws. The European Union now forces around forty-nine thousand companies to report exactly how much energy they use, how they impact the climate, and what goes on in their supply chains¹⁰¹. The EU Emissions Trading System's extension to maritime shipping, requiring vessels to surrender allowances for verified emissions, represents the most significant binding standard yet applied to the shipping sector¹⁰². These are important precedents. But they are only regional, not universal.

ECOSOC should use its coordination mandate to advocate for a two-tier Mandatory Energy Transition ESG Framework applicable at the multilateral level. The first tier would assess states on energy registry transparency, state-owned enterprise accountability, fossil fuel subsidy disclosure, and participation in the energy trade transparency protocol described in section 7.2. The second tier would assess private actors — shipping companies, energy traders, mineral extraction firms — on beneficial ownership disclosure, verified emissions reporting, supply chain human rights performance, and compliance with critical mineral benefit-sharing obligations.

ECOSOC should use its power to create a two part green rules framework for the whole world. The first part would grade countries on how honest they are about their energy

¹⁰⁰ WEF, "3 Ways the Global South Can Harness Clean Energy Supply Chains," December 2024, <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/12/clean-energy-global-south/>.

¹⁰¹ Council Fire, "How to Communicate ESG Progress Credibly for Maritime & Logistics Companies," March 2026, <https://www.councilfire.org/guides/communicate-esg-progress-credibly-maritime-logistics-companies/>.

¹⁰² Ibid.



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registries, state businesses, fossil fuel subsidies, and trade honesty. The second part would grade private companies like shipping lines, energy traders, and mining firms on their real emissions, human rights records, and how well they share profits with local communities.

The goal here is not just to punish people because ECOSOC cannot hand out fines or sanctions. Instead, it can tell banks and global trade organizations to only give money and support to countries and companies that actually follow these rules. In a world where poorer countries desperately need cash to go green, controlling who gets that money gives ECOSOC real power. True success is not about the pretty speeches countries make, but about how they actually behave. ECOSOC needs to make sure that if a country lies or cheats, everyone sees it and it costs them big time.

8. Closing Remarks

Throughout this study guide, we have told you many things. Perhaps too many.

But beneath all of it, there is really only one story: the world has built a system for managing energy that it can no longer trust. And the price of that distrust is paid most heavily not by those who built the system — but by those who have no choice but to live within it.

In 2022, Russia turned off a pipeline. Europe shook, markets collapsed, and a family in Mozambique could no longer afford to cook a meal. In 2026, the Strait of Hormuz closed. Factories went dark in Tokyo, alarms rang in Seoul — and 32 million people across South Asia faced the risk of falling below the poverty line. These events are not separate. They are different faces of the same fragility.

That fragility is this: the world governs energy not as a shared public good, but as a geopolitical weapon. And that way of governing has both a cost and an alternative.

You know the cost by now — we have laid it out in numbers, in case studies, in footnotes. The alternative, we have sketched in the final two chapters of this guide: a fairer financial architecture, a more transparent energy trade, a more equitable transition, a more binding framework of accountability.

So where does ECOSOC's role begin?



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Here: ECOSOC cannot stop wars. It cannot protect pipelines. It cannot compel great powers to honor international law when it is inconvenient for them to do so. But ECOSOC is the only organ in the United Nations system built specifically to coordinate, name, and propose solutions to the human consequences of exactly these kinds of systemic failures. That mandate may sound modest. But what is missing most acutely in today's crisis is precisely this: the institutional will to bring all the pieces together, to see who is losing and how much, and to bend the system back toward alignment with human dignity.

We ask delegates to sit with three questions:

When an energy crisis erupts, who pays the bill? What can ECOSOC do to ensure that bill is distributed more fairly? And most importantly: when the next crisis comes, can the decisions made in this room today make that bill a little lighter to bear?

The answers are not easy. But asking these questions, and searching for their answers together; that is exactly what ECOSOC was created to do.

We trust that delegates will approach these questions with both analytical rigor and a genuine sense of human responsibility.



9. Questions to Be Addressed

1. What specific measures can ECOSOC recommend to protect people in poor, import-dependent countries from rising food and energy prices caused by energy crises that they had no part in creating?
2. How can ECOSOC ensure that international clean energy investment reaches the developing countries that need it most, rather than flowing almost entirely to wealthy nations?
3. What can ECOSOC do to help coal-dependent developing countries transition to cleaner energy without causing mass unemployment or economic collapse in the communities that currently depend on fossil fuel industries?
4. How can ECOSOC ensure that the communities in developing countries whose land and water are damaged by critical mineral mining receive fair compensation and a genuine share of the benefits of the green transition?
5. What reforms to international energy finance — including debt relief, grants, and emergency funds — should ECOSOC recommend to help the most vulnerable countries survive energy price shocks without sacrificing development progress?
6. What steps can ECOSOC recommend to make global energy trade more transparent and to prevent ships and companies from evading international rules by hiding their ownership and disabling their tracking systems?
7. How can ECOSOC improve coordination between international organizations such as the IEA, IRENA, and the IMO so that the world responds more effectively and equitably when the next energy crisis hits?
8. What can ECOSOC recommend to make Just Energy Transition Partnerships more reliable and better funded, so that developing countries are not left without support when donor countries withdraw their commitments?
9. How can ECOSOC hold states and corporations accountable when their decisions — such as weaponizing energy supplies or operating shadow fleets — cause serious economic harm to developing countries?
10. What long-term framework should ECOSOC establish to ensure that the global green energy transition reduces inequality between countries rather than deepening it?



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